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Planners Amid the Storm: 
Planning and Politics in the Contested 
Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem
Marco Allegra and Jonathan Rokem
Introduction
This chapter delves into the contentious nature of the planning process in the 
metropolitan area of Jerusalem by examining the role played by planners; it 
investigates the complex and nuanced relation between planners and con" ict 
by observing how contextual factors shape the planning process and determine 
its outcomes, and how planning is embedded in the surrounding society.
As far as the relation between planning and politics is concerned, Jerusalem 
represents a rather exceptional case study because of the partisan urban policies 
developed by Israel after the reuni! cation of the city in 1967. Still, we maintain 
that the observation of such an exceptional case study can be useful in 
advancing our understanding of the relation between planning, con" icts and 
power.
Our work is based on the examination of a variety of primary and secondary 
sources, including a number of in-depth interviews with Israeli planners 
conducted in 2010. The use of these sources—along with our academic and 
professional background—allows us to present a ! rsthand account of planners’ 
self-perceptions, discourses and practices in the Jerusalem region.
Planning in the Face of Power
Since the pathbreaking contribution by John Forester (1982, 1989), the 
relation between planning and politics has been one of the major themes of 
inquiry and discussion among planning theorists. The background of this 
chapter is therefore the ongoing debate on planning theory and practice, and 
its relation to issues of power, con" ict and collective identities. As far as the 
theoretical foundations of planning are concerned, this debate can be imagined 
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as contained between two opposed philosophical outlooks represented by 
Jurgen Habermas’s ideal of deliberative rationality and public space (1979, 
1983, 1987, 1990) and the more power-oriented, agonistic conceptions of 
politics inspired by the work of Michel Foucault (1979) and Chantal Mouffe 
(1993, 1999, 2000, 2005).
Drawing on Habermas’s work, a large and diverse stream of literature—
commonly referred to as ‘communicative’ or ‘collaborative’ planning—has 
been developed (Forester 1989, 1999; Innes 1995; Healey 1992, 1996, 1997). 
This ‘communicative turn’ in planning theory emphasized the role of debate 
among the stakeholders as an appropriate practice of deliberation, as well as its 
potential in reducing con" ict among them through appropriate discursive 
practices. The success of the communicative turn in reframing planning theory 
and practices prompted a wave of criticism from scholars who deemed that 
communicative theorists placed too much emphasis on inclusive arenas of 
deliberation and communicative practices. Communicative theorists, the 
critique goes, devote little attention to the social and political context where 
deliberation—and ultimately planning—takes place (Yiftachel 1998, 1999; 
Yiftachel and Huxley 2000; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002).
It is not our intention to elaborate “a pragmatic and progressive planning 
role for all those planning in the face of power” (Forester 1982: 67), or to 
provide a ‘test’ of communicative theories by using the case of Jerusalem—for 
a similar effort in the deeply polarized context of Northern Ireland, see Brand 
and Gaf! kin (2007). Indeed, in few other cities in the world would the partisan 
asymmetry of planning—as well as the absence of either ‘soft’ or ‘hard 
institutions’ (Healey 1997) to promote ‘conversation between groups’ and a 
fair representation of all stakeholders in the public arena—be more evident 
than in post-1967 Jerusalem. As Sandercock (2000: 29) notes, “a political 
space had to be created for this approach [communicative planning] through 
political action” before actually implementing the good planning practices 
described by communicative theorists. Still, the debate provides us with a 
valid theoretical starting point and with methodological suggestions. In turn, 
we maintain that the observation of such politicized, contentious urban 
development processes can advance our understanding of the role of planning 
in different kinds of con" ict situations by exploring its embeddedness in the 
surrounding social, political and institutional environment (Yiftachel 1998) 
and its Realrationalität (Flyvbjerg 1996)—the contingent, non-ideal and non-
normative rationality informing any speci! c planning process.
In this respect, we argue that Jerusalem represents at the same time what 
Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) de! nes as an extreme and a critical case. It is an extreme 
case—a case that makes a point in “an especially dramatic way” (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 229)—with respect to fundamental issues at the center of the debate on 
communicative planning (e.g., the dynamics of the inclusion/exclusion of 
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stakeholders, the retreat into professional space in the face of power and the 
ambiguous nature of the notion of ‘good planning practices,’ etc.). More subtly, 
Jerusalem represents a critical case as it has a “strategic importance in relation 
to the general problem” (ibid.), namely the issue of planners’ agency; in other 
words, observing planners’ autonomous agency in Jerusalem—where, as the 
rhetoric goes, ‘everything is politics,’ and planning policy is dictated by 
political imperatives—implicitly strengthens the argument for understanding 
the relation between planning and politics in a non-linear, non-hierarchical 
fashion.
This chapter delves therefore into issues such as: the planners’ assessments 
of the interplay between planning and politics; their perceptions of their own 
professional roles in the polarized environment of Jerusalem; and the 
interaction of professional and political arguments in shaping the planning 
process. In doing so, we aim to explore the role of planners in con" ict situations, 
and their delicate role in framing the perspectives of coexistence in the city. 
Our goal is therefore twofold: on the one hand, we aim to go beyond the 
de! nition of ethical, professional and normative ideals of ‘good’ planning 
practices; on the other hand, we aim to escape the reductionist image of 
planners as one-dimensional agents of unprofessional or altogether unethical 
political interests—a recurrent theme in politically polarized environments 
such as Jerusalem.
Planners Amid the Storm
It has been suggested that cities in general are undergoing “a radical 
restructuring in geographical distribution of human activity and in the 
political-economic dynamics of uneven geographical development” (Harvey 
2001: 346). As a result, the diversity of cities and their residents’ different 
identities have become a central topic of concern for planning policy and 
practice, and for urban theory in general (Fincher and Jacobs 1998: 1; Fincher 
and Iveson 2008: 2). In any planning process there is an interaction of 
professional and political arguments shaping the planning outcome and the 
delicate role of planners in framing the perspectives of coexistence in the city. 
In few cities is the planning–politics nexus more evident than in Jerusalem, to 
the point that a vast number of contributions portray the city as a case where 
one of the cardinal functions of planning—the mediation between the State 
and competing societal interest—is severely undermined by the structural 
exclusion of the Palestinian community from the planning process itself, and 
more broadly from decision-making arenas. The unavoidable starting point of 
our exploration of planners in Jerusalem is the realization of the deep, 
entrenched politicization of planning in the city, as well as the partisan nature 
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of the latter; paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz, Anthony Coon said that, if 
“[w]ar has been described as politics carried out by other means[,] in the West 
Bank [including conquered East Jerusalem] planning is war carried out by 
other means” (Coon 1992: 210).
At the same time, Jerusalem represents a case of “planning in turbulence” 
(Morley and Shachar 1986: 3), where the professionals involved in planning 
have to cope with radical, and to a certain extent unpredictable, changes, with 
problems that are well beyond the ! eld of intervention of planning itself—
however broadly we de! ne it—and with a diffused social perception of crisis, 
anxiety and imminent disaster. While these conditions determine a situation 
where the lack of a ‘planning doctrine’ is manifest, “what is evident, however, 
is a strong sense of purpose […] behind developments in East Jerusalem,” 
namely, “[t]he widely, if not unanimously shared political goal [of] the 
permanent uni! cation of Jerusalem under Israeli rule” (Faludi 1997: 98). In 
the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War, crucial decisions regarding land 
use, housing and infrastructure were taken directly by the highest ranking 
policy makers of the Israeli government. Those decisions “aimed […] at 
minimizing uncertainty”:
This strategy called for the creation of facts that would constrain possibilities, 
limit options, or even close certain options for the city in the future. To be 
speci! c, the option that had to be closed was the redivision of the city, and 
closing it was not only conceived as an action taken against external bodies 
but also by the government itself. (Schweid 1986: 112)
This outlook determined some fundamental planning choices—such as the 
choice of a ‘dispersed’ model of urban development over a ‘compact’ city 
(Schweid 1986; Faludi 1997)—and resulted in a marked gap between 
communities in terms of housing, services provisions and infrastructure 
investment. In this sense, “the Israeli ‘place’ is a product of a contested socio-
historical process, characterized by motivation for controlling national space 
and framing it in a total manner. Such a decisive approach generates counter-
products which are also spatially expressed” (Yacobi 2004: 7).
Indeed, in this chapter we try instead to delve into the complex and nuanced 
relation between planners and con" ict by observing how different contextual 
factors shape planners’ perceptions of the planning process and determine its 
outcomes. In order to do so, we interviewed both planners working in 
administrative of! ces and bodies—such as the Ministry of Housing and the 
Civil Administration, the military agency administering the West Bank, but 
also the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies (JIIS), the independent research 
center that publishes for example the authoritative Statistical Yearbook of the 
city—and planners working in NGOs—such as Bimkom, Peace Now, BTselem, 
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Ir Amim and others—explicitly committed to the achievement of a just 
Israeli–Palestinian peace, democracy and human rights.
We refer to these two categories as ‘mainstream’ and ‘activist’ planners. This 
distinction is, in the ! rst place, a pragmatic starting point to refer to the 
different professional af! liation of the respondents, and the different 
institutional roles they have in the planning process. More generally, “norms 
of the governing culture are usually embedded in institutional frameworks of 
planning and policy expressing the values of the ethnically prevailing majority” 
(Sandercock 2000: 15), or as Maarten Hajer put it, in ‘story-lines,’ which he 
de! nes as
exclusionary systems because they only authorize certain people to 
participate in them […]. [S]tory-lines are narratives on social reality through 
which elements from many different domains are combined providing 
actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding. 
(Hajer 1997: 49)
In this respect, the distinction also points to different narratives about planning 
developed by the two groups. In Jerusalem, ‘mainstream’ planners tend to 
represent the of! cial Israeli planning discourse, or ‘story-line,’ about planning 
in the city and to regard their activity as determined by adherence to a set of 
(neutral) professional practices. On the other hand, the activity of ‘activist’ 
planners can be conceptualized through the model expressed by the notion of 
‘insurgent planning’ (Sandercock 1998), to the extent that ‘activists’ not only 
tend to challenge the conventional wisdom of ‘mainstream’ planners about 
Israeli planning in Jerusalem and operate outside the formal institutions of the 
planning system, but also emphasize the socio-political and ultimately 
controversial nature of planning practices themselves.
It is important to stress, however, that even in the polarized environment of 
Jerusalem multiple overlaps exist between these two categories. ‘Mainstream’ 
planners become ‘activists’ and stern critics of policies they themselves have 
contributed to implementing; ‘activist’ planners work in West Jerusalem with 
the same municipal of! cers whose policies in East Jerusalem they criticize. 
Different degrees of endorsement and criticism toward Israeli of! cial policies—
as well as political positions in general—are voiced by individuals and 
organizations.
Planners in the Face of Power
How do planners see the interplay between planning and politics with respect 
to major urban development issues in the metropolitan area? As John Forester 
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notes, “[i]f planners ignore those in power, they assure their own powerlessness” 
(Forester 1982: 67). To begin with, the community of planners in Jerusalem is 
deeply aware of power issues and the politicization of planning; still, this 
consciousness seems to have provided little relief or guidance to planners 
themselves.
As a whole, the planners working in the Israeli administration—whom we 
call ‘mainstream’ planners—are almost unanimous in regretting the absence of 
what Faludi calls a ‘planning doctrine.’ As a senior municipal planner remarks, 
the political choice to opt for a dispersed urban model was “imposed on the 
planners to handle,” and
[i]f it was left to the planners, they probably would not decide to [put] in the 
south Gilo [a Jewish settlement included in the municipal boundaries] 
somewhere … But to grow gradually, step by step toward that … The major 
decisions are political decisions and the planners have to cope with it. (I. 
Kimhi, interview)
In the same vein, a senior city planner of the Jewish settlement of Ma’ale 
Adummim comments:
I think that Jerusalem lacks a lot in planning: it does not have a general 
view. After 1967, the Ministry of Housing and the government tried to 
achieve certain political goals in Jerusalem […]. I don’t think that there was 
a really [much thought] about […] how this town will function, if it’s good 
to put these neighborhoods as an addition to the small and very weak city 
of Jerusalem. (G. Brandeis, interview)
The deteriorated situation of housing in Jerusalem is another of the recurrent 
concerns of ‘mainstream’ planners. On the one hand, as a planner in the JIIS 
observes, noting the “con" ict between urban goals and government goals:”
every time a developer wants to develop something in the city center […] 
they would tell him to develop residences there [for the Jewish population]. 
Why? Because they want to keep the demographic balance. Residences, 
residences, residences … and then the city center is not functioning, or it’s 
much less functional than it used to be because every time they develop 
residences instead of services, arts, museums, employment, as it should be. 
(A. Shapira, interview)
On the other hand, many ‘mainstream’ planners point out the interference of 
international political pressures in restricting access to the housing reserves 
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available (for the growth of Jewish population) in the settlements located in 
the West Bank:
[t]here’s a growing demand for housing in Jerusalem, it can’t all be met in 
West Jerusalem, some of it has to be met in the neighborhoods around 
Jerusalem […]. And the non-building of Ma’ale Adummim [and] Beitar 
[two Jewish settlements built after 1967 in the periphery of the city, whose 
expansion plans had been frozen by the Israeli government], because of the 
political issues, has basically brought about the fact that the youngsters of 
Jerusalem have nowhere to go. (B. Weil, interview)
Most ‘mainstream’ planners tend to interpret these political obstacles on the 
road to good, rational planning in terms of a burden imposed by the con" ict as 
a whole on the metropolitan area. ‘Politics’ is therefore often depicted as 
hostile to the creation of a positive atmosphere for planning discussion. As a 
senior planner in the Ministry of Housing notes in explaining the shelving of 
the 1994 Metropolitan Plan, “[i]t’s hard to implement an idea when you have 
bombs in the buses” (Z. Efrati, interview); others point out that the development 
of a professionally balanced scheme created con" icts with the political process 
by setting preconditions to the negotiations (R. Khamaisi, interview; a similar 
view about the 1994 Metropolitan plan is put forward by Adam Mazor, see 
Bollens 2000: 153–154). Similarly, the chaotic residential sprawl in Jerusalem 
is interpreted as the result of the competition for land resources, and not of 
Israeli policies. When asked about the effect of the Israeli policy of ‘facts on 
the ground’ and the encroachment of Jewish settlements into Palestinian 
areas, a former city planner and senior researcher at the JIIS replies:
fact on the ground was done both by Israelis and Palestinians. There is a 
tremendous amount of construction by the Palestinians—although they are 
shouting that we are not allowing them, and so on, so forth … But if I compare 
the situation on the ground, from air photographs and so on, I can see the 
difference … There is a tremendous housing development by the Palestinians, 
they are growing twice as quickly as the Israelis. (I. Kimhi, interview)
The divergence between politics and planning, however, does not account for 
the whole narrative of planning in Jerusalem. This is obviously true for those 
planners who hold a more critical view of Israeli-established policies—whom 
we call ‘activist’ planners for their widespread engagement in the activity of 
progressive, pro-peace NGOs such as Bimkom, Ir Amim, BTselem, etc. 
‘Activist’ planners, indeed, share the sentiment of frustration in confronting 
the urban reality of Jerusalem, but they reject inde! nite notions of ‘politics’ 
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and ‘con" ict’ as obstacles to planning, pointing instead to structural inequalities 
generated by the partisan nature of Israeli policies.
In explaining the distortions of urban development, they point to the 
demographic imperatives behind Israel’s policy, the late and poor planning in 
Palestinian neighborhoods, the collusion between government of! cials and 
the Jewish settlers, the political use of national parks and green areas to limit 
Palestinian growth and, in the end, the substantial consensus among the 
different branches of local and national government about the fundamental 
goals and principles of urban policy (A. Cohen-Lifshitz, E. Cohen-Bar, 
interviews; see also Kaminker 1997).
From this point of view, the impossibility of planning for the entire 
metropolitan area depends on the overall coherence between planning and 
politics. The partisan nature of the system would shape the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion in the planning process and determine the intrinsic 
ambiguities between political-demographic and functional de! nitions of the 
region. As a Palestinian-Israeli planner who participated to the drafting of the 
1994 Metropolitan Plan notes:
I do not think that the term ‘metropolitan’—according to how it’s known 
in the Western countries, which is the notion of metropolitan [integration] 
from the functional point of view—[…] actually ! ts the situation here in 
Jerusalem … We have a dual system, one for the Palestinians and the second 
for the Israelis, OK? […] The functional actually follows, or is limited [by], 
the political agenda. (R. Khamaisi, interview)
Their frustration is therefore derived from the perception of conducting an 
uphill battle against public authorities and planning institutions, and of their 
own relative isolation in the political arena, as well as in public opinion. Our 
respondents are unanimous in stressing the huge costs of their activities of 
‘counter-planning’—monitoring the sensitive areas of urban development, 
preparing alternative planning schemes, submitting objections to planning 
authorities and ! ling petitions to courts—against the very small results they 
achieve. They describe a trade-off between the importance and political 
sensitivity of the debated issue and their chance of success:
[t]he planners in the of! ces, they say, “This is politics, don’t talk to us 
here in this committee about politics; we are talking about planning.” 
(E. Cohen-Bar, interview)
I am not very optimistic about [going to courts] either […]. For example, in 
the petition against E-1 in 1998, it was rejected on the ground that is a 
general petition that deals with issues that are primarily political in nature. 
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Now, you can argue this almost on everything in the West Bank, so that’s 
why we actually avoid as much as possible, anything that can hit on a 
political argumentation, but still, if they want they can always say it. 
(N. Shalev, interview)
Planners in the Mirror
Given the widespread realization of the politicization of planning issues, 
how do planners make sense of their own professional role? How do they 
reconcile their activities with the existence of partisan policy goals and 
power asymmetries? These questions directly address not only the role of 
planners as professionals, but also their personal political and ideological 
worldviews; they force us to take into account the subtle ways in which 
living in an extremely polarized context in" uences this worldview, as well as 
the role of lies and self-deception (Flyvbjerg 1996).
As David Morley and Arie Shachar point out, a common answer to these 
environmental pressures is for planners to
base their proposals on a discourse that avoids viewing them from a 
particular ideological perspective. This approach becomes a strategy to 
create legitimation for the objective methodology of planning as a way 
to hold in check the strongly held and con" icting positions among 
planners and their clients regarding critical issues. (Morley and Shachar 
1986: 145)
Indeed, many of the ‘mainstream’ planners seem to adopt this strategy. The 
separation is in the ! rst place a personal, “psychological separation of an 
administrative ‘me’ from a political ‘them’ ” (Bollens 2000: 109). Our 
interviews contain several passages in which the planner stresses his non-
political role. As one respondent puts it, “I am not a politician […]. The 
attitude of this of! ce is very professional; we are not into political issues” (B. 
Weil, interview). Though never requested to do so, the planners interviewed 
often declare their political preferences—usually in a convoluted manner: “I 
am not known as very right-wing, on the contrary” (I. Kimhi, interview)—
only to immediately distance themselves from any political stance by 
recalling their professional attitude. Planners and politicians would belong 
to two separate types: in an interview, a senior member of the Ma’ale 
Adummim planning team in the 1970s argues that he could have an open 
and fair dialogue with any planner irrespectively of his ethnic background, 
while openly blaming politicians of both communities for the continuation 
of the con" ict (T. Leitersdorf, interview). The separation between the roles 
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of planning and politics also implies what we could call a differentiation in 
time; planners begin their work after politicians ! nish theirs. Planners do 
not make decisions and act within a context whose boundaries are determined 
by politicians; their role is to make sure that political deliberation is 
translated on the ground in a professional way.
The second barrier is a methodological one. The planners as professionals 
would look at urban problems through a different set of lenses and instruments 
to the ones used by politicians, and act following a different code. Israel Kimhi 
stresses the need to “postpone issues of sovereignty; […] let’s talk over the next 
! ve–ten years on a practical level—how we can live together” (Bollens 2000: 
107). More broadly, the advantage of long-term planning would therefore be 
“to get rid of the organizational distortions” (Adam Mazor on the 1994 
Metropolitan Plan, ibid.: 148) linked to present political uncertainties; the use 
of functional de! nitions would bypass issues of sovereignty. Speci! c professional 
techniques—such as the ‘potential model’ (I. Kimhi, B. Weil, Z. Efrati, 
interviews)—could even have an inherent value in terms of con" ict manage-
ment and resolution.
Those barriers ultimately provide the planners with the feeling that a ‘safe 
space’ of planning ultimately exists, where they can exercise their professional 
expertise. In this space they can maintain their non-ideological posture and 
deal with contentious issues as purely urban issues. An interview with a planner 
in the JIIS is worth quoting at length:
I am speaking about the basic urban level of services, employment, 
transportation. […]. I think that the basis for a joint life does not have to 
include any political restructuring […] [and] whatever be the political 
structure, those urban problems can be solved and solving them would be 
the beginning of a joint urban […] life, even if it would be under Jewish 
control […]. In my opinion […] there are a lot of problems and well, of 
course, political change of frameworks would do … may advance things 
greatly—maybe it won’t—but it may advance things greatly, but I think 
that things can advance even without any change of political framework. I 
know that the facts in the last forty years are against what I am saying, but 
I think that [recently] there is an advancement. (A. Shapira, interview)
From time to time, however, a more porous relation between planning and 
politics emerges in the activity of planners. Despite their constant reminding 
of the frustrating subordination of planning to politics, many senior 
‘mainstream’ planners can refer to “glorious times” where “planning and 
political considerations went hand in hand” (Thomas Leitersdorf on the 
planning of Ma’ale Adummim, quoted in Tamir-Tawil 2003: 155–156). Israel 
Kimhi recalls the early times after Jerusalem’s reuni! cation as
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the most fortunate situation for a planner—that you are needed. We were 
needed by the politicians—what road to open, what to knock down, where 
is the sewage, what to do. They simply came to us—we had all the 
information. We were prepared for this act of reuni! cation. It was a glorious 
time. (Bollens 2000: 109)
In a more self-re" ective vein, another member of the Ma’ale Adummim 
planning team during the 1970s elaborates on the (politically motivated) 
decision to ‘build eastwards’:
If we do not regard the political aspect of it, I think it was a normal step […] 
giving Jerusalem more time to deal with building in the city […], as within 
the city you have to [proceed very slowly and carefully] […]; if there would 
[have been] no political pressure, and still you would say: “No, we are not 
going to let the market dictate it, but we are going to plan it,” […] 
where would you recommend to build a new city? It would be [eastwards]. 
(E. Barzacchi, interview)
This coherence does not have a simple instrumental value for the planners; 
sometimes it harmonizes with the planners’ feelings and values. David Best 
de! nes his experience of planning the neighborhood of East Talpiot as an 
effort to do something new in terms of planning practice (in relation to design, 
organizational elements, even communicative planning practices). At the 
same time, he states:
I was convinced it was right. It was beyond the border, but only just, and it 
was a project that should go ahead, for the defense of a united Jerusalem. 
From a geo-political point of view I thought it was right. I also thought that it 
was right from a social point of view, creating a strongly built edge to Jerusalem 
on the southeast desert landscape. (quoted in Forester et al. 2001: 60)
The analysis of the ‘glorious times’ of planning in Jerusalem raises an important 
issue. Despite the recurrent argument of the subordination of planning to 
politics, the issue of planners’ agency surfaces from time to time. As David Best 
notes, the interaction between a planner and his client is one of reciprocal 
exchange and manipulation:
generally, my major aim is to try to get people to believe that they have 
arrived at conclusions which they feel are right […]. I don’t work with 
people who say, “Look, you do as I say; you have no say in the matter.” 
(quoted in Forester et al. 2001: 61, 63)
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Best’s description of his struggle over the location of the residential 
neighborhood of East Talpiot is a telling episode of how planners can be 
able to form coalitions, anticipate political opposition, make an opportunistic 
use of a variety of planning and political arguments, and jump the 
hierarchy in order to achieve their goals (ibid.). Who was manipulating 
whom in that ‘glorious time’? Thomas Leitersdorf, chief architect in the 
Ma’ale Adummim planning team, offers us an insightful picture of Israeli 
decision-making by describing the way the ! nal location of the settlement 
was chosen:
When we put the alternatives to the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, 
headed at the time by Ariel Sharon, the only questions asked were: “Which 
of the alternative locations has better control over the main routes?” And 
“Which town has a better chance to grow quickly and offer qualities that 
would make it competitive with Jerusalem?” I replied that according to 
these criteria the ideal location would be location A [the present site of 
Ma’ale Adummim] […]. At that moment Sharon rose and declared, without 
consulting the Committee, that “the State of Israel decides on location A.” 
(quoted in Tamir-Tawil 2003: 153–154)
In the case of Ma’ale Adummim, the planners wanted to change the location 
of the settlement before the meeting of the Committee, wishing to do so for 
architectural and planning reasons: climate, morphology of the terrain, 
proximity to employment centers, accessibility to infrastructures and to be 
able “to see the light of Jerusalem from Ma’ale Adummim” (E. Barzacchi, 
interview; also T. Leitersdorf, interview, and Tamir-Tawil 2003: 153). If we dig 
below the surface of Leitersdorf’s quote—apparently a crystal-clear case of top-
down, politico-strategic decision-making—we get the sense of how the 
planners managed to steer the process because they strategically interpreted 
the planning–politics bundle inherent to decision-making.
For ‘activist’ planners, the barriers between political and planning 
considerations are much more porous. On the one hand, they hardly bother 
to claim any professional neutrality, and are far more outspoken about the 
political role of planners in Jerusalem. NGOs such as Bimkom, BTselem, Ir 
Amim and Peace Now de! ne their missions in terms of commitment to 
human rights and democracy, and their involvement in planning issues is a 
direct consequence of the politics–planning nexus in Jerusalem. On the 
other hand, their judgment of the role of Israeli planners in shaping post-
reuni! cation Jerusalem is straightforwardly negative. Meron Benvenisti, 
formerly deputy mayor of Jerusalem and senior planner of the municipality, 
sums up this attitude, harshly rejecting any claim of neutrality from the 
‘mainstream’ planner community:
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Planners want to get jobs. They are part of the political systems, of the 
power relationship … The fact that they ! nd excuses is something else. I 
don’t trust them at all. […] There are very few planners who refuse to plan 
in the occupied territories, most of them hide behind that excuse, “We 
are trying to be [neutral].” The fact that you do that plan is political … 
otherwise you should refuse. If you don’t refuse, you become part of the 
process. (M. Benvenisti, interview)
Indeed, the history of planning in Jerusalem presents well-known cases of 
‘conversions’—and especially among the older generation of city planners. 
Meron Benvenisti, Sara Kaminker and Elinoar Barzacchi, to name but three, 
have gone from holding key positions in the municipal planning of! ces to a 
stern opposition to Israeli policies in the city after completely breaking their 
ties with the Israeli administration.
In our interviews with ‘activist’ planners—as well as in the documents 
published by the NGOs in which they work—the shift between political and 
planning considerations is much more straightforward; for them the emphasis 
on the legal ground of their objections and the need for good planning 
practices is directly anchored to a political commitment toward more 
equitable relations between communities. Planning is therefore perceived as 
a political tool to act on the behalf of a disadvantaged community; its 
inherent political value is testi! ed to by the emphasis on the goal of 
“[empowering] the [Palestinian] residents themselves with the skills and 
knowledge that will enable them to continue to actively participate and 
protect their rights in matters of planning” (Bimkom 2006: 2); the same 
outlook is re" ected in the activity of Ir Amim’s joint Israeli–Palestinian 
urban planning working group, aiming at enhancing community participation 
in planning for Palestinians by creating a Palestinian planning administration 
and a separate master plan for East Jerusalem (The Peace and Democracy 
Forum/Ir Amim 2009: 4–5). As an architect working for Bimkom notes, this 
is a justi! cation of their action well beyond the achievement of tangible 
results in planning terms; citing a case of house demolition, she declares 
“[w]e don’t believe that our petition […] will stop demolitions, but we want 
to raise awareness” (E. Cohen-Bar, interview).
Discussion
Jerusalem represents a particularly dramatic example—an ‘extreme case,’ as 
Flyvbjerg (2006) would put it—of the nexus between politics and planning. 
The question implicitly raised by this chapter—is there a ‘planning answer’ to 
systemic turbulence and entrenched political polarization?—should therefore 
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be considered in the light of an understanding of planning as a social practice 
embedded in the contradictions of the society as a whole.
From this point of view, probably in few places other than Jerusalem, it is 
more obvious that planning issues are more broadly issues of power and 
democracy, and that planners face not only narrow technical issues, but 
political and systemic problems. In this respect, there can be no narrow 
‘planning answer’ to political problems; Robert Dahl’s (1989) caveat about the 
inability of procedural democracy itself to deliver substantive democracy also 
applies to those technical tools of social engineering and decision-making 
procedures that make up the planning system. Before discussing planning in 
terms of technicalities and ‘good planning practices’—a central theme in the 
debate on communicative planning—we should therefore consider the criteria 
for the inclusion of stakeholders, the drawing-up of the agenda to be discussed, 
and the basic rules of decision-making—in other words, the social, political 
and economic context in which planning takes place.
Jerusalem offers multiple examples of how crucial planning questions cannot 
be resolved through the narrow reference to ‘good’ or ‘professional’ planning 
practices. If we look, for example, at any single moment of the planning 
process, the case for the advantages of a narrowly professional approach can be 
made by stressing the latter’s potential for minimizing con" icts within the 
boundaries of a given situation; still, the long-term adoption of such a strategy 
of depoliticization of urban issues is likely to accommodate the status quo and 
perpetuate con" icts (see for example Forester 1982; Bollens 2000: 23–27). The 
acknowledgment of the contextual nature of planning is also crucial to evaluate 
the scale and location of planning interventions. To what extent can single 
projects or local episodes of ‘good planning’—let us say preserving green areas 
in West Jerusalem through the development of a participatory process with the 
local (Jewish) community—be separated from their systemic consequences 
(the increased pressure to accommodate Jewish housing needs by building in 
the eastern part of the city)?1 More generally, to what extent is it realistic to 
focus on what has been done—and neglect what has not been done? By referring 
to speci! c ‘good planning practices,’ we risk missing the fact that the most 
important factor affecting the Palestinian community in Jerusalem has not 
been the active curtailment of population growth—which took place 
anyhow—through restrictive planning or demolition orders, but instead the 
outright absence of planning for Palestinian neighborhoods.
The acknowledgment of the social nature of planning practices is crucial, 
not only for evaluating planning practices per se or the functioning of the 
planning system as a whole. Situating the experience of planners helps us in 
making sense of their subjectivity; the social context is the background against 
which they frame urban issues, look to their professional role and make 
signi! cant personal and career choices.
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Two recurrent themes emerge, for example, in our interviews, both among 
‘activist’ and ‘mainstream’ planners. On the one hand, there is the reference to 
a set of ‘good practices’ rooted in the methodology of their profession—the 
need to collect direct, ! rsthand knowledge of the urban issues and landscape, 
to adopt sophisticated technical tools and to consider the stakeholders’ needs 
and voices—also signaling the discursive and professional shift from the once 
widely held rationalistic conceptions of planning as a problem-solving, cost–
bene! t technique toward a more process-oriented, participative ideal of 
planning. On the other hand, there is the planners’ frustration in the face of 
uncertainty, political impasse and polarized attitudes of the stakeholders, and 
the subordination of the planning issues to political imperatives.
Both the reference to good planning practices and the feeling of frustration, 
however, assume different meanings for ‘mainstream’ and ‘activist’ planners. 
For the majority of ‘mainstream’ planners, good practices represent the ! rst 
and foremost requirements of the profession and are a way to minimize con" icts 
on the way to urban development; con" icts originate because ‘politics get in 
the way’ of good planning. For ‘activist’ planners, ‘good planning’ is instead 
framed in terms of a revolutionary or insurgent action—and a colossal and 
often unfruitful effort, hence their frustration—against the status quo. The 
inclusion of all stakeholders in the planning process, for example, is at the 
same time good professional practice and a radical claim for the political 
inclusion of the Palestinian community—a call for a dramatic reorientation of 
past Israeli policies.
Last but not least, the embeddedness of planners in the socio-political 
environment—of which they are a product themselves—allows us to 
investigate planners’ agency. Planners do face political issues beyond the 
narrow realm of planning; yet, on the other hand, they are also political actors 
in the decision-making process. Indeed, planners can adopt a wide range of 
strategies in order to steer the planning process, from the strategic use of their 
professional expertise to lobbying and political activism, from opportunistic 
tactics to the deception of clients and public opinion.
In Jerusalem, the narrower, professional frame adopted by ‘mainstream’ 
planners needs therefore to be problematized. First, the ‘retreat’ to the 
neutrality of the profession represents a strategy in dealing with political issues, 
and therefore, implicitly, a political action. Moreover, in the face of the 
complex overlap between planning and politics in Jerusalem, the statement ‘I 
don’t deal with political issues’—expressed by individual planners, planning 
of! ces and commissions or by the court system—is inherently ambiguous and 
allows ample room to maneuver. Second, planners’ personal experiences and 
worldviews are never immune from the political culture and climate. In our 
interviews, the rhetoric about the planners’ ability to ‘keep a balance’ does not 
hide the recurrent emergence of political arguments, inclinations and passions 
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as factors in their professional choices and therefore in the planning process. 
Third—as anecdotes such as those recounted by David Best, Thomas 
Leitersdorf and Israel Kimhi, among others, reveal—planners do have agency 
in steering the planning process by using both the tools of their profession and 
more ‘political’ personal and institutional devices.
The case of ‘activist’ planners provides us with yet another example of 
socially situated agency. As Amit Ron and Galit Cohen-Blankshtain observe 
about the Kaminker project—a deliberative planning initiative conducted by 
Bimkom in the Palestinian neighborhood of Issawiya—“[h]ad we chosen to 
measure Bimkom’s planning process against any ideal model of deliberative 
planning, we would have to deem it a failure” (Ron and Cohen-Blankshtain 
2011: 646), citing the limitations inherent in the process itself and the 
impossibility of passing the plan through hostile planning commissions. Still, 
as the authors put it, deliberation can be understood “as a form of political 
representation that competes with other forms of representation” (ibid.: 637). 
In this case, planners’ agency goes well beyond the narrow boundaries of the 
planning system and of professional practice.
The issue of planners’ agency reveals the value of Jerusalem as a ‘critical case’ 
in the relation between politics and planning. What we mean is that observing 
planners’ autonomous agency in Jerusalem—where, as the rhetoric goes, 
‘everything is political’ and planning policy is dictated by political imperatives—
implicitly strengthens the argument for understanding the relation between 
planning and politics in a non-linear, non-hierarchical fashion.
Without considering carefully the interplay of planning and politics, one 
would support a misleading and somehow dangerous notion of the separability 
between the two realms of politics and planning—or between politics and any 
other technical knowledge involved in decision-making or policy imple-
mentation. Following that thread risks ending up with the idea that a precise 
hierarchy exists between the two—be it the subordination of the latter to the 
former or vice versa—and that what planners really need is to ‘learn to deal 
with politics’ to develop the progressive potential that is inherent to their 
profession (this is the outlook emerging from the contributions by John 
Forester 1982, 1984; see also Forester et al. 2001).
In the case of Jerusalem, this illusion tends to be translated into the arti! cial 
dichotomy between all-powerful politicians making use of powerless planners—
either in the role of victims or in that of disciplined soldiers of the politicians 
themselves. Still, we suspect that, should we focus our analysis exclusively on 
politicians, we could very easily report the same perception of the intractability 
of the problems—uncertainty, frustration and impotence. The interviews 
could be repeated again, with very similar results, for every category of actor: 
Israeli grassroots activists, Palestinian businessmen, Jerusalem notables, etc. 
Should we then conclude—in what can be either a very deep insight on the 
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nature of life or, more likely, a poor and super! cial understanding of social 
phenomena—that nobody is steering urban development in any measure?
This is obviously not the case in Jerusalem, where partisan planning has 
decisively contributed to shaping urban development over almost half a 
century. Nevertheless, our feeling is that, rather than looking for a ‘plan’ or a 
neatly de! ned set of instrumental and hierarchical relations, we should delve 
instead into the complexity of Israeli decision-making—a bundle of 
institutional and individual networks, ideology and expertise, strengths and 
pathologies developing against the background of the polarized environment 
of municipal and national politics. We should allow for the relaxation of the 
predetermined assumptions of roles, patterns of behavior and reciprocal 
interactions of the actors involved, and focus instead on the dif! cult and 
painful reconstruction of the actual dynamics of social and political phenomena.
Appendix: List of Interviewees
Elinoar Barzacchi (Former City Engineer, Municipality of Jerusalem; Co-Director, Steering 
Committee—Jerusalem Metropolitan Plan and Development Plan; Planner, Ma’ale 
Adummim Planning Team).
Meron Benvenisti (Former Deputy Mayor and City Council Member, Jerusalem 
Municipality).
Gadi Brandeis (City Planner, Municipality of Ma’ale Adummim).
Efrat Cohen-Bar (Architect, Community Planning Department—Bimkom).
Alon Cohen-Lifshitz (Architect, Community Planning Department—Bimkom).
Zvia Efrati (Head, Program Department—Ministry of Housing).
Rassem Khamaisi (Planner, IPCC; Planner, Jerusalem Metropolitan Plan and Development 
Plan Planning Team).
Israel Kimhi (Senior Researcher, Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies; Former City Planner, 
Municipality of Jerusalem).
Thomas Leitersdorf (Chief Architect, Ma’ale Adummim Planning Team).
Nir Shalev (Researcher, Community Planning Department—Bimkom).
Asaf Shapira (Researcher, Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies).
Benjamin Weil (Head, Jerusalem District Of! ce—Ministry of Housing).
Note
1. It is interesting to note that the largest mobilization by Israeli citizens against a 
single development project in Jerusalem (with a total of 16,000 planning objections 
presented to the planning commission) was organized against the so-called ‘Safdie 
Plan’ (Outline Plan 37/1, foreseeing the construction of about 20,000 housing units 
over an area of 26.6 km2 of open space to the west of Jerusalem), mostly by 
environmentalist organizations; since 2006, the protest so far has been successful in 
sinking the plan. Without mentioning the Safdie Plan speci! cally, many respondents 
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pointed to the exhaustion of housing reserves in West Jerusalem as a factor in 
strengthening the need of such development in the eastern part of the city—for 
example in the E-1 area.
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